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THE PRECONDITIONS FOR HOME RULE
Louis Michael Seidman *

I.

THE PARADOX OF SOVEREIGNTY

Events too recent to require detailed recounting illustrate once again some
ancient if forgotten truths: Real sovereignty is indivisible, irrevocable, and
unconditional. Home rule on good behavior is a contradiction of terms. A
people who holds the power of self-determination only so long as what it
determines meets the approval of a superior entity is not free. Self-government that is subject to rescission whenever rescission meets the needs of
those in power is not self-government at all.
Fifteen years ago, it was easy to overlook these hard facts. After a long
struggle, the District of Columbia seemed poised on the brink of true political equality. On the local level, for the first time in generations, an elected
Council and Mayor controlled the District with broad jurisdiction over its
affairs.' Indeed, as some contemporary opponents of the Home Rule Charter pointed out, the new District of Columbia government combined powers
traditionally wielded by both state and city officials. 2 In some respects, the
District had greater undivided power than either the cities or the States in
the remainder of the country.
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am especially grateful to

David Satter, whose ruminations about "home rule" in the Soviet Union sparked my interest

in this subject. I also received important help from William Eskridge, Steven Goldberg,
Thomas Krattenmaker, Gary Peller, Philip Schrag, Girardeau Spann, David Strauss, Mark
Tushnet, and the participants in the Georgetown Law Center Faculty Research Workshop, all
of whom made comments on an earlier draft of this article. Valuable research assistance was
provided by Barry Pollack and Christine Taylor. Research for the Article was supported by a
grant from the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973), reprintedin I D.C. CODE ANN. at 175 (1981 & Cum.
Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Home Rule Act].
2. As Representative Nelson remarked:
H.R. 9682 creates a city-State, virtually all State legislative, executive, and judicial
authority [is] transferred to the local 'home rule' government. I know that my home
State of Minnesota, where I served in the legislature ... did not delegate the type of
authority we are delegating here in the bill to the city of St. Paul ....
119 CONG. REC. H8715 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1973). For a discussion, see Newman & DePuy,
Bringing Democracy to the Nation's Last Colony.* The District of Columbia Self-Government
Act, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 537, 556-569 (1975).
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On the national level, a constitutional amendment had established the
right of District residents to participate in Presidential elections, 3 and the
District's delegate to Congress gave it a voice, albeit not a vote, in legislative
affairs.4 To many contemporary observers, these measures constituted an
obvious precursor to full District representation in national affairs.5
Of course, advocates of home rule disfavored continued congressional veto
power over the District's laws,6 the important restrictions on the jurisdiction
of the District's Council,7 federal control over the local judiciary,' and the
3. Section 1 of the twenty-third amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint
in such manner as the Congress may direct:
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number
of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled
if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in
addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a
State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the
twelfth article of amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
4. The District of Columbia Election Act creates a "Delegate to the House of Representatives from the District of Columbia" who has a "right of debate, but not of voting" and who
"shall have all the privileges granted a Representative by section 6 of Article I of the Constitution." 2 U.S.C. § 25a (1988).
5. See, e.g., Suffrage at Last, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1973, at A22, col. 1:
To those who have insisted for so long - as we have - that Washingtonians should
be accorded the democratic rights of full citizenship, this grant of a modified
franchise is not fulfillment, not the true home rule, that other American communities
enjoy. But it is a genuine opportunity for the people of the nation's last colony to
seize new local initiative toward that end.
6. Section 602(c)(1) of the Home Rule Act requires the Council to transmit all but emergency measures to Congress where they can be disapproved within a thirty-day period by a
concurrent resolution passed by both Houses of Congress. Home Rule Act, supra note 1,
§ 602(c)(1) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(1) (1987)). Section 602(c)(2)
of the Act formerly permitted a one House veto within thirty days of measures amending titles
22, 23, and 24 of the D.C. Code. However, the Supreme Court declared one and two house
vetoes unconstitutional. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In response to Chadha,
Congress amended the Home Rule Act to require action by both Houses and the President to
veto a District statute. See Home Rule Act, supra note 1, § 602(c)(2) (codified as amended at
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(2) (1987)).
7. See, e.g., Home Rule Act, supra note 1, § 603(a), reprintedin 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 27
(Supp. 1989) (affirming Congress' authority to authorize and appropriate the total budget of
District of Columbia Government); Id. § 603(b)(1), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 28
(Supp. 1989) (limiting the District's authority to issue general obligation bonds); Id. § 603(c),
reprinted in I D.C. CODE ANN. at 28-29 (Supp. 1989) (imposing requirements on District
budget submitted to Congress).
8. The Home Rule Act creates a Judicial Nomination Commission consisting of members appointed by the President, the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar, the
Mayor, the District's Council, and the chief judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Id. § 434(a), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 1-11 (Supp. 1989).
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requirement of congressional approval of every line of the District's budget. 9
But the District nonetheless seemed to have come a long way from the days
when it amounted to a mere plaything for a few oligarchs who served as city
commissioners under the not always benevolent guidance of the chairmen of
the House and Senate District Committees. The vestiges of the old colonial
status seemed just that - insignificant concessions to the necessity of political compromise and temporary accommodations that would last only so
long as the gradual but inexorable process toward complete emancipation
went forward.
Even from the perspective of fifteen years hindsight, this judgment is not
altogether wrong. Certainly, citizens of the District fare much better today
than they did in the days when Congress accorded the whims of Representative Natcher the status of law. But the limitations on the District's autonomy are neither so temporary nor so insignificant as they once appeared.
The District's march toward full emancipation no longer seems inexorable.
Both the legislative and constitutional paths to statehood are blocked,"0 at
least for now, and presently no discernible national constituency for change
Section 434(d)(1) provides that in the event of a vacancy in the local courts, the Commission
shall submit a list of three nominees to the President who, in turn, selects one of them for
submission to the Senate for confirmation. Id. § 434(d)(1), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at
13 (Supp. 1989). If the President fails to select a nominee from the list within sixty days, the
Commission is empowered to appoint a person on the list to fill the vacancy. Id.
9. See id. § 603(a), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 27 (Supp. 1989). The Act also
makes clear that Congress retains "the ultimate legislative authority over the Nation's Capital
granted by article I, section 8, of the Constitution ..
" Id. § 102(a), reprintedin I D.C. CODE
ANN. at 177 (1981). Even if the Act did not contain this language, it is doubtful that Congress
could constitutionally divest itself permanently of this Article I power. For a discussion, see
Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM.
B. FOUND. REs. J. 381. As a practical matter, this reservation of authority means that Congress need not comply with the thirty day veto provision envisoned by the Act. Congress
retains the power at any time to enact legislation that would preempt and thus rescind measures enacted by the District Council. Recently, Congress attempted to utilize this residual
power to amend the District's Human Rights Ordinance. See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
10. In 1978, Congress approved a constitutional amendment that would have given the
District voting representation in both Houses of Congress. H.R.J. Res. 554, 92 Stat. 3795
(1978), reprinted in I D.C. CODE ANN. at 357 (1981). However, three-fourths of the state
legislatures did not ratify the amendment within the seven year time limit specified in the
amendment. See Time Runs Out for District of Columbia Proposal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22,
1985, at B13, col. 4.
In 1983, while the amendment was still pending ratification, the District applied to Congress
for statehood. The House District Committee favorably reported a statehood bill in 1987, but
it was never brought to a vote. The Senate has never taken any action on the application. For
fuller account, see Schrag, The Future of District of Columbia Home Rule, 39 CATH. U.L.
REV.

311-17 (1990).
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exists. Worse still, recent events make the threat of retreat from home rule
far more real than the promise of advance.
Even in the halcyon days immediately after enactment of the Home Rule
Charter, Congress never entirely gave up meddling in local District affairs. "
Yet recent congressional encroachments have changed in character as well
as in number. 2 No longer content to use the congressional veto power intended to vest it with residual control over District affairs, Congress has
increasingly resorted to appropriations riders to control everything from the
minutiae of city government' 3 to vital city policies regarding matters such as
5
nondiscrimination' 4 and regulation of the District's own employees.'
This new congressional interest in the District raises several points of
note. First, many, although not all, of these recent measures clearly fall
11. Congress has remained interested in a wide range of District affairs. See, e.g., H.R.
Con. Res. 228, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) and S. Con. Res. 63, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Stat.
1435 (1979) (vacating H.R. Con. Res. 228) (overturning District law that would have forbid-

den construction of foreign chanceries in most residential neighborhoods); H.R. Res. 208, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 22,7542-79 (1981) (House of Representatives veto of District
of Columbia Sexual Assault Reform Act of 1981); Act of Sept. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-399, 90
Stat. 1205 (establishing Temporary Commission on Financial Oversight of the District of Columbia); Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-614, 88 Stat. 2286 (establishing the Office of the
People's Counsel within the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia).
12. See generally Schrag, supra note 10, at 313-16.
13. For example, Congress has used its appropriations power to prohibit the installation
of meters in District taxicabs, District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93405, 88 Stat. 822, 827 (1974) (1975 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-333, 90 Stat. 785, 791; District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1977,
Pub. L. No. 94-446, 90 Stat. 1490, 1494 (1976); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-288, 92 Stat. 281, 287; District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L.
No. 95-373, 92 Stat. 699, 704 (1978); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-93, 93 Stat. 713, 717 (1979); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1981, Pub. L.
No. 96-530, 94 Stat. 3121, 3126 (1980); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-91, 95 Stat. 1173, 1180 (1981); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1983, Pub. L.
No. 97-378, 96 Stat. 1925, 1931 (1982); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-125, 97 Stat. 819, 825 (1983); Act. of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,739 (1984)) (1985 Continuing Appropriations); Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 99 Stat. 1185, 1224 (citing
H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,090 (1985) (1986 Continuing
Appropriations); and to limit the hours of use of the swimming pool at Woodrow Wilson High
School. 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 826.
14. See Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 100462, § 145, 102 Stat. 2269-14 (1988) (requiring District Council to amend Human Rights Ordinance pertaining to nondiscrimination against homosexuals) [hereinafter Armstrong
Amendment I]. Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No.
101-168, § 141, 103 Stat. 1284 (1989) (directly amending Human Rights Ordinance pertaining
to nondiscrimination against homosexuals) [hereinafter Armstrong Amendment II].
15. District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 141(a), 102
Stat. 2269-13 (1988) (requiring the District to adopt and implement a preference system that
does not preclude the hiring of noncity residents).
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outside any conceivably legitimate ambit for congressional involvement.
Congress has not limited itself to cases concerning District statutes that impact on federal policy or on the States. Perhaps Congress can justify the ban
on a commuter tax' 6 or on the use of federal funds to pay for abortions 7 on
this federal policy basis. However, the forced repeal of the District's antidiscrimination law"8 and the prohibition on the use of District funds for abortion" surely cannot be justified on the grounds that these actions further
federal policy. Congress' conduct in these areas can only be understood as a
frontal assault on the core principle of home rule.
Second, recent congressional meddling in District affairs especially insults
and demeans the District's residents because it has so little to do with the
District itself. Congressional grandstanding on issues like homosexual rights
in the District is obviously intended for national consumption.2" It offers
members of Congress a free vote on morality issues to satisfy vociferous local
constituencies. Members of Congress may vote freely because of the District's marginal status. It would be bad enough if District residents were
being governed by an entity over which they lacked control. But they are
not so much being governed as being made an example of. Precisely because
Congress appears largely indifferent to the welfare of its citizens, the District
serves as a convenient symbol that Congress can manipulate without cost.
Finally, each congressional encroachment on home rule does damage that
extends far beyond the abrogation of the particular policy favored by District residents. Each such encroachment reenforces the conditional, revocable nature of the "rights" accorded District residents.
With each
encroachment, the District's Council and the Mayor effectively receive a
clear message that they may act only so long as they stay within acceptable
bounds. Once Congress effectively conveys this message, it no longer needs
to actually utilize its power of rescission. The credibility of the threat suffices to destroy home rule. 2'
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(5) (Supp. 1989).
17. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 117, 101
Stat. 1329-90, 1329-99 (1987).
18. Armstrong Amendment I, supra note 14, at 102 Stat. at 2269-14.
19. District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 117, 102 Stat.
2269-9 (1988).
20. See, e.g., The President's Whipping Boy, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1989, at A20, col. 1.
21. The District Council's recent abandonment of a proposed gun control bill illustrates
the point:
The D.C. Council yesterday backed away from a confrontation with Congress by
shelving - and possibly killing - its controversial bill to hold handgun manufacturers financially liable for injuries and deaths caused by shootings ....
At its first reading two weeks ago, the legislation was approved by an 8 to 4 vote,
but at least three council members who had supported the bill or were noncommittal

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 39:373

Here, of course, we return to the point with which I began - the indivisibility of sovereignty and the unconditionality of true freedom. Yet embedded within these truths lies an important paradox. For the United States
Constitution has as a defining characteristic the creation of a web of overlapping sovereign entities,22 and the lesson of our political history is that grants
of freedom are never truly irrevocable.
The remainder of this Article is devoted to exploring the ramifications of
this paradox. The Article argues that real emancipation for the District,
when it finally comes, will be grounded on political and cultural, rather than
legal, change. The essential precondition for freedom rests upon a built-in
system of unconscious inhibitions against domination - inhibitions that
center on an implicit recognition of the equal moral worth of the people who
reside in the District of Columbia. The nature of these inhibitions, rather
than legal protection, makes a grant of sovereignty unconditional. Until this
precondition is met, legal protections - including those that accompany
statehood - mean nothing. When the precondition is met, legal protections
are superfluous.
The strategy for elaborating on these points primarily consists of a doublebarreled attack on the proposition that statehood would significantly alter
the District's status. Section II of this Article argues that current legal doctrine, properly understood, already provides the District with many of the
protections that supposedly would accompany statehood. Section III then
spells out the mirror image of this proposition: statehood standing alone
would not provide a significant legal bulwark against congressional
domination.
changed their minds after warnings that the bill could needlessly antagonize Congress at a time of fragile support for home rule.
D.C. Shelves Gun Law to Placate Hill, Wash. Post, July 12, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
22. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51 in THE FEDERALIST: A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 323-24 (H. Lodge ed. 1888):
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others. ...
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as
public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power;
where the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner
as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interests of every individual
may be a sentinal over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less
requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the state.
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 in id. at 299-307 (examining the separation of powers under
the Constitution).
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I do not mean to suggest that the struggle for statehood is therefore pointless or unnecessary. But in the final section, I argue that the importance of
that struggle is widely misunderstood. The struggle itself, rather than the
outcome of the struggle, has transformative political potential. By confronting the rest of the country with the morally anomalous status of the
District, statehood advocates can help to mold the preconditions for home
rule. Statehood alone will not create those preconditions. Statehood, when
it is finally achieved, will symbolize that the District's residents have already
won the battle.
II.

DOMINATION AND THE DISTRICT:

A

CONSTITUTIONAL

CASE STUDY

The recent wave of congressional interference with District affairs has not
gone without legal challenge. In an extraordinary lawsuit filed by all thirteen members of the District's Council, the Council argued that Congress
'2 3
lacked the constitutional authority to enact the "Armstrong Amendment,
which ordered the Council to revise local law so as to exempt religious institutions from the statutory ban on discrimination against homosexuals. 24 In
2 a panel of the United States Court
Clarke v. United States,"
of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the congressional action violated
the free speech rights of members of the Council and affirmed the order of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia which had
entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs.26 In response, Congress bypassed both the Council and the court of appeals opinion by inserting a new
23. Armstrong Amendment I, supra note 14, at 102 Stat. at 2269-14.
24. Section 145(c) of the amendment, which Congress included as part of the District of
Columbia Appropriation Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, 102 Stat. 2269 (1988), stated:
(b) None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be obligated or expended after
December 31, 1988, if on that date the District of Columbia has not adopted subsection (c) of this section.
(c) Section 1-2520 of the District of Columbia Code (1981 edition) is amended by
adding after subsection (2) the following new subsection:
"(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the laws of the District of Columbia, it shall not be an unlawful discriminatory practice in the District of Columbia for any educational institution that is affiliated with a religious organization
or closely associated with the tenets of a religious organization to deny, restrict,
abridge, or condition"(A) the use of any fund, service, facility, or benefit; or
"(B) the granting of any endorsement, approval, or recognition,
to any person or persons that are organized for, or engaged in, promoting, encouraging, or condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle, orientation, or belief."
25. 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
26. Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
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version of the Armstrong Amendment, which directly amended the District
27
of Columbia Code, into the District's annual appropriations statute.
Although Congress ultimately succeeded in circumventing the court of
appeals decision, the court's opinion retains one enduring virtue: it puts to
rest a nonsequitur that has recurrently plagued discussion of the District's
legal status. Just because Article I grants to Congress the power to "exercise
exclusive Legislation"" over the District, it does not follow that Congress
can do anything it chooses. The District clause power, like all of Congress'
Article I powers, is subject to restraints contained in the rest of the Constitution.2 9 Although the court does not go nearly so far, properly understood,
these restraints sweep broadly indeed, providing the District with protection
against violations of home rule that virtually equal the protections the District would enjoy as a state.
Clarke provides a case study for the purpose of cataloguing some of these
restraints. Although they are drawn from diverse sections of the Constitution, they stand for a single overarching constitutional principle: Congress
may not enact legislation that is the product of the political impotence of the
District and its residents. Although Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate, it lacks the constitutional authority to dominate.
27. Armstrong Amendment II, supra note 14, at 103 Stat. at 1284. Congress included the
amendment as part of the District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-168,
103 Stat. 1267 (1989). The amendment contained the following:
(b) Section 1-2520 of the District of Columbia Code (1981 edition) is amended by
adding after subsection (2) the following new subsection:
"(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the laws of the District of Columbia, it shall not be an unlawful discriminatory practice in the District of
Columbia for any education institution that is affiliated with a religious orgranization or closely associated with the tenets of a religious organization to
deny, restrict, abridge, or condition"(A) the use of any fund, service, facility, or benefit; or
"(B) the granting of any endorsement, approval, or recognition, to any
person or persons that are organized for, or engaged in, promoting, encouraging,
or condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle, orientation, or belief."
Armstrong Amendment II, supra note 14, 103 Stat. at 1284.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17.
29. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 410:
Congress' authority over the structure of local government in the District of Columbia is indisputably broad, but it is not boundless. Congress has the discretion to
create institutions of government for the District and to define their responsibilities
only 'so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution' .... This
limitation on Congress' powers is merely an instance of the general principle that the
Government may not disregard the strictures of the Constitution when conferring
discretionary benefits.
Id.(citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973)).
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Before turning to doctrinal particulars, two preliminary caveats are in order. First, it is not my intention to spell out these constitutional arguments
in full detail. The purpose of what follows is to be suggestive rather than
definitive. That purpose will be achieved by demonstrating that a wide range
of plausible arguments exists that, when fully fleshed out, bear the potential
of significantly restraining congressional authority over the District.
Second, I make no claim that any of the arguments below compels a particular result. Nor am I prepared to predict that these arguments would
actually succeed before any particular court. Rather, my claim is that there
are respectable strands of existing constitutional doctrine, text, and tradition
that support the arguments. Stated another way, the arguments catalogued
below provide the means for a sympathetic judge, who wished to do so, to
reach the desired conclusions while remaining well within the bounds of
standard contemporary constitutional discourse. Whether a particular judge
would desire to do so depends precisely on the extent to which that judge
recognizes the claim of District residents to equal moral worth. To find
these arguments plausible, the judge herself must have internalized the beliefs that represent a precondition to home rule. As Part III will make clear,
no constitutional text or doctrine of its own force will produce that
internalization.
A.

The Facts

Understanding the various arguments that might be advanced in support
of the result in Clarke demands several additional background facts. Clarke
grew out of a controversy concerning enforcement of the District's Human
Rights Act3" - a statute that was itself subject to congressional veto under
the Home Rule Charter and that broadly prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and education on a wide variety
of grounds unrelated to individual merit, including sexual orientation. 3'
A group of Georgetown University students filed suit under the ordinance
32
claiming that Georgetown discriminated against its homosexual students.
Georgetown University responded that its treatment of homosexual students
30. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 to 2557 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
31. The Act prohibits discrimination based upon "race, color, religion, national origin,

sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical handicap, source of income, and place or residence or
business." Id. § 1-2501.
32. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Georgetown University,
536 A.2d 1, 14 (D.C. 1987).
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rested on religious conviction and that applying the ordinance to its conduct
would violate the University's first amendment free exercise rights.3 3
In Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University,34 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that Georgetown need not officially recognize gay
student groups, but that the Human Rights Act did require Georgetown to
provide facilities and services to gay student groups that equalled those provided to other student groups. 35 Moreover, the court held that, as so construed, the statute was consistent with the free exercise clause.36
After the court of appeals decision, the University entered into negotiations with the students. The parties entered into a consent decree that embodied the court's mandate while, in the University's view, fully respecting
its religious orientation and tradition. Accordingly, both the University and
the students elected to forego their right to seek United States Supreme
Court review.37
Apparently unwilling to allow Georgetown University to decide for itself
what protected its religious freedom, Senator Armstrong thereupon succeeded in attaching to the District's appropriations act a rider that would
3 The rider prohibited the expendihave effectively overruled Georgetown."
ture of any funds appropriated to run the District government unless the
District Council amended the Human Rights Ordinance in precisely the
manner specified by Congress. 39 The proposed amendment stated that any
educational institution "affiliated with a religious organization or closely associated with the tenets of a religious organization" could lawfully and discriminatorily deny benefits to persons "engaged in, promoting, encouraging,
or condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle, orientation, or belief."' Rather
than comply with the terms of the rider, members of the District's Council
filed suit.4
Two broad categories of argument were available to attack the amendment: some arguments relating to the unusual procedure Congress utilized
to work its will and other arguments relating to the substance of what Congress commanded. Ultimately, however, both types of argument stem from
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.at 39.
36. Id.
37. See Healy, A Letter to the Alumni and Faculty of Georgetown, reprinted in AMERICA
455 (Apr. 30, 1988).
38. See Armstrong Amendment I, supra note 14, at § 145, 102 Stat. at 2269-14.
39. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
40. Armstrong Amendment I, supra note 14, at § 145(c), 102 Stat. at 2269-14.
41. Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). See also supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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the overarching anti-domination principle that precludes congressional action premised on the District's lack of political power.
B.
1.

ProceduralArguments

Home Rule and Free Speech

Any catalogue of the arguments available to the Clarke plaintiffs must
begin with the argument that actually prevailed in the court of appeals. The
court held that it need not reach questions concerning the power of Congress
to enact the Armstrong language directly because compelling members of
the Council to introduce and vote in favor of the Armstrong language violated their right to free speech. 42
Superficially, the first amendment free speech guarantee might seem an
implausible source for an argument against the Armstrong amendment. The
court of appeals opinion appears not to understand the nature of what philosophers call performative utterances. 43 True, Congress effectively commanded members of the District Council to say certain words. But it did so
because of what the words did rather than because of what they communicated. Congress made no effort to control what Council members said about
the Armstrong amendment. Congress left the Council free to denounce or
ridicule it. Congress was concerned only that the Council enact the amendment language into law. The very fact that Congress compelled the Council
to do so deprived this act of whatever communicative significance it might
otherwise have had.' Indeed, if the circuit court is correct that compelled
42. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 417.
43. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233-52 (2d ed. 1970).
44. In United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990), the court upheld a district
court order requiring city council members to vote for an ordinance that the city had agreed to
enact as part of a consent decree. The court held that the first amendment argument advanced
by members of the council "require[d] no extended discussion." Id. at 457. Assuming arguendo that voting was entitled to first amendment protection as symbolic speech, the court
concluded that:
the public interest in obtaining compliance with federal court judgments that remedy
constitutional violations unquestionably justifies whatever burden on expression has
occurred.... The council members remain free to express their views on all aspects
of housing in Yonkers. But just as the First Amendment would not permit them to
incite violation of federal law ....
it does not permit them to take action in violation
of such law.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Clarke court distinguished Yonkers on the ground that Yonkers' refusal to pass ordinances required by the consent decree was "itself an illegal act." Clarke, 886 F.2d at 415 n.12.
In contrast, "the refusal of the appellees in this case to enact the legislation contained in the
Armstrong Amendment would not be illegal - or even subject to legal penalty but for the
Armstrong Amendment.
... Id. This analysis suggests that the result in Clarke would
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official acts violate free speech guarantees, then it would seem to follow that
the court would lack the constitutional authority to order a trial judge who
thought that the Armstrong amendment was constitutional to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
Yet despite these difficulties, the court's opinion makes some sense when
read against the backdrop of the anti-domination principle. The court is
surely correct that there is something especially offensive and demeaning
about Congress forcing the District Council to do its dirty work. The court
proceeds on the assumption that Congress had the constitutional power to
enact the Armstrong language directly into law.4 5 Requiring the Council to
do so, despite its opposition, seems gratuitously insulting.
Of course, no clause in the Constitution outlaws gratuitous insult. But an
important element of our'free speech jurisprudence rests on the impropriety
of deliberate efforts to degrade individuals by compelling them to recognize
the correctness of views they do not share. The free speech clause is premised on a preference for persuasion through the free exchange of ideas,
rather than domination through the exercise of raw power. 4" Thus, the government may not short-circuit the persuasion process by the simple expedient of forcing individuals to pledge allegiance to the flag,47 utter loyalty
oaths,4" or display a state slogan on their license plates.49 Coercive measures
change if Congress first required repeal of the Human Rights Ordinance and then, in separate
legislation, required Council members to vote for the repeal. Whether Congress effects its will
in one enactment or two does not seemingly matter.
45. See Clarke, 886 F.2d at 414. Although this assumption is challenged below, see infra
notes 51-54 and accompanying text, the point is that the Armstrong amendment is vulnerable
even if Congress could have effected its will in another way. Indeed, Congress' supposed ability to amend District law directly supports the view that it has no valid interest in compelling
the Council to vote for the repealer.
46. For a classic statement of this view, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
Id. at 375.
For an extended discussion of the first amendment as a protection of the persuasion process,
see Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression (forthcoming).

47. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
48. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
49. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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of this sort are insulting precisely because they treat their targets as objects
to be manipulated rather than as intellectually autonomous individuals capable of deciding for themselves the truth of the speech the state wishes to
compel. 5°

The District Council, unlike individual citizens, is subservient to Congress. Therefore, some may think that these cases are distinguishable. In
particular, Article I expressly gives Congress the authority to dominate the
District.5 ' Thus, even though the State may not force citizens to declare
their allegiance to it, an appellate court can order the court below to enter a
mandate after a successful appeal. Unlike citizens and the State, trial and
appellate courts are in a hierarchical relationship. Similarly, Congress is
under no obligation to persuade an administrative agency exercising delegated power to do its will. On the contrary, delegated power is constitutionally legitimate precisely because Congress restrains the discretion of
administrators through the imposition of standards. 2
But although the appropriate constitutional pigeonhole for the District's
Council is far from clear, it should be obvious that the Council is not just an
administrative agency.5 3 A popularly elected legislature is responsible to its
constituents. The Constitution does not compel Congress to establish such a
body. Perhaps Congress can, if it wishes, establish a federal dictatorship for
the District. On this view, Article I provides Congress with authority to
enact the Armstrong language or any other constitutionally permissible statute. But what it cannot do is establish a "Potemkin Village" version of
democracy. 4
50. For an argument that measures of this sort are unconstitutional because they constitute an irrational effort to coerce internal preferences, see Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self
Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J. LAW & HUM. 149 (1989).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17 (Congress has power "[t]o
exercise exclusive legislation

in all cases whatsoever, over such District ....
").
52. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-548 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.
1971).
53. Indeed, Supreme Court decisions have suggested that even administrative agencies are
not mere tools of Congress, but rather retain a sphere of constitutionally protected autonomy.

See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) ("The Constitution does not contemplate
an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws

it enacts.")
54. As the Clarke court argued:

Through the Home Rule Act, Congress has furnished the District with a democratic form of government and vested the legislative power of this government in the
Council. Therefore, members of the Council are "legislators" in every traditional
sense. As such, they enjoy broad First Amendment protections in discharging their
responsibilities .... Unless and until Congress restructures District government to
divest the Council of its legislative functions, it must respect the broad First Amendment rights that the Council members enjoy by virtue of their status as legislators.
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A generation ago, the Supreme Court held that even though the Constitution does not require that state officials be chosen by popular election, if the
States choose to accord the franchise to its citizens, the elections must be
genuine. 55 A state could not take advantage of the legitimacy that comes
with popular sovereignty without creating the reality of that sovereignty.
Similarly, Congress cannot dominate the District while pretending that an
autonomous city council governs the District. Having established the illusion of a popularly elected legislature with authority to legislate for the District, Congress cannot then tell the Council what legislation to enact.
In summary then, the Armstrong amendment violates free speech principles because it constitutes an impermissible effort to short-circuit the process
of free debate by commanding allegiance to a political position. This sort of
compulsion is appropriate for entities in hierarchical relationships with each
other, but not for morally autonomous entities. Congress has the constitutional authority to impose hierarchy on the District if it chooses to do so.
However, it lacks the authority to enjoy the privileges of such a hierarchy
while maintaining the illusion of autonomy.
2. Home Rule and ConditionalSpending
The argument above focuses on Congress' use of the District Council to
accomplish its own objectives. A closely analogous argument centers upon
the use of the appropriations process. Congress did not simply order the
District Council to enact the Armstrong language. In form, at least, it gave
the Council a choice. It could either enact the Armstrong language or
forego its entire appropriation for the year. 56 This was, to be sure, the kind
of "choice" that The Godfather understood. Is it the kind of choice that the
Constitution permits?
Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
55. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628-29 (1969). In Kramer,
the Supreme Court reasoned:
The need for exacting judicial scrutiny of statutes distributing the franchise is undiminished simply because, under a different statutory scheme, the offices subject to
election might have been filled through appointment. States do have latitude in determining whether certain public officials shall be selected by election or chosen by
appointment and whether various questions shall be submitted to the voters. . ..
However, 'once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
Id. (quoting from Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)).
56. Armstrong Amendment I, supra note 14, § 145(b), 102 Stat. at 2269-14.
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After fifty years of argument, the constitutional status of conditional
spending measures remains ambiguous.57 The confusion began with Justice
Roberts' opinion in United States v. Butler,"8 which held that Congress exceeded its spending powers by offering to pay farmers to reduce their productive acreage. 9 In a characteristically murky opinion, Justice Roberts
seemed to say that the withholding of a benefit amounted to unconstitutional
coercive pressure designed to accomplish objectives beyond Congress' powers.' ° In so holding, the Court relied upon the "obvious" distinction between a statute "stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be
expended" and "[a statute] effective only upon assumption of a contractual
obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be
61
enforced."
Unfortunately, this distinction has turned out to be less obvious than Justice Roberts imagined, and later courts have capitalized on its diaphanous
quality to cut back substantially on Butler.62 Yet Justice Roberts' underlying insight - that in a welfare state, there is often no meaningful distinction
between the withholding of benefits and the imposition of burdens - remains an important one. 6 3 Moreover, the core holding of Butler, that Congress lacks unlimited power to extend its writ by purchasing compliance,
remains the law.
In South Dakota v. Dole,' the Supreme Court recently summarized the
limits on Congress' spending power in the course of upholding a statute that
conditioned a portion of federal highway funds on the willingness of States
to adopt a minimum drinking age. 65 The Court held that conditional grants
are constitutional only if they meet three requirements: First, the grants
57. For two recent efforts to make sense of the confusion, see Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989), and Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988).
58. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 72. Justice Roberts further complicated matters by asserting that the conditional spending would be unconstitutional even "if the plan were one for purely voluntary cooperation." Id.
61. Id. at 73.
62. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), overruled on

other grounds, California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).

63. This point has not escaped the attention of one of the most perceptive opponents of
the welfare state. "The new constitutional order thus comes to us bereft of the old common

law baseline, and without a new baseline to replace it. Given this legal void, it is quite impossible to say that a certain reform introduces either a subsidy or a penalty that needs to be
constitutionally justified." Epstein, supra note 57, at 99.
64. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
65. Id. at 207-08.
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must be in pursuit of the general welfare (although the Court indicated that
Congress had very substantial, perhaps even unlimited, leeway in defining
this term);66 second, the conditions under which Congress provides the
money must be spelled out unambiguously to provide the recipient with a
clear choice of whether to accept the condition;6 7 and, third, the conditions
must be related to the federal interest in the particular project or program.6"
How does the Armstrong amendment fare under this tripartite test? Obviously, appropriations to run the District government are in the "general
welfare," and although it may be less than obvious that the condition benefiting religiously affiliated educational institutions serves the common good,
it is extremely unlikely that a court would invalidate the condition on this
basis. Moreover, there is nothing even mildly ambiguous about Congress'
imposition of the condition. But the amendment runs afoul of the third Dole
requirement. The Armstrong amendment did not simply deny the District
funds to finance enforcement of the Human Rights Ordinance; it precluded
the District from spending any money for any purpose. Perhaps a restriction
on the expenditure of funds to enforce the ordinance against religious
schools would vindicate the federal interest in religious freedom. But, there
is no federal interest in ending garbage collection, police protection, and
public education in the District. Cutting off funds for these purposes
amounts to nothing more than an effort to coerce District officials. It is
domination, pure and simple. As the Dole Court acknowledged, the exact
contours of the "relatedness" requirement are unclear,69 but if the requirement has any meaning at all, the total termination of all funding for any
purpose must violate it.
Some may argue, however, that Congress' special powers over the District
make cases like Dole and Butler inapposite. The Supreme Court decided
Butler at a time when the Court believed that constitutionally mandated
principles of federalism deprived Congress of the direct power to control the
acreage of farmers.7 ° Against this backdrop, the Court held that Congress
could not accomplish indirectly (through conditional spending) a result that
66. Id. at 207.
67. Id. See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
68. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08; see also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,
461 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Federal Government may exact non-discriminatory user taxes
upon the states that approximate the states' fair share of benefits accrued from the federal
program); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-96 (1958).
69. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
70. Cf, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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could not be achieved directly by legislative fiat. 7 Similarly, in Dole, the
Court assumed arguendo that the twenty-first amendment deprived Congress of the power to interfere directly with state regulation of the consumption of alcoholic beverages.7 2
However, Congress faces no similar constraint against legislation for the
District. Under the District clause of Article I, Congress could have directly
amended the Human Rights Ordinance.7 3 Given this fact, it seems odd to
say that Congress could not have achieved the same objective by conditioning spending on the willingness of the District Council to adopt the
amendment.
There are two response to this argument. First, the structure of the Dole
opinion74 strongly suggests that the Supreme Court viewed Congress' spending powers as limited even in circumstances where Congress could accomplish the same result directly through use of some other Article I power.
The first half of Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority addressed the
requirements that the spending clause be imposed without regard to any additional obstacles that might be posed by the twenty-first amendment. In
this section of the opinion he spelled out the tripartite test.75
Only after demonstrating that the statute in question satisfied these three
requirements did Justice Rehnquist turn to the "remaining question:"
"[w]hether the twenty-first amendment constitutes an 'independent constitutional bar' to the conditional grant of federal funds.",76 The Court held that
the "independent constitutional bar" requirement does no more than prohibit the Federal Government from using spending to induce the states to
engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional or from utilizing such extreme financial inducements that "pressure turns into compul71. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936). Thus, in reaching its decision, the
Court relied upon the fact that the regulation of acreage was within the power reserved to the
states: "Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by
the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indirectly accomplish those
ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance." Id.

72. 483 U.S. at 206. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI § 2 ("The transportation or importation into any State Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.").
73. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973). In Palmore,the United

States Supreme Court held that congressional legislative power over the District of Columbia
is plenary. "Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied
to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or
local purposes." Id. See also Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899).
74. 483 U.S. at 207-08.
75. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
76. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209.
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sion. ' 77 Clearly, however, these additional requirements apply only in
circumstances where an independent constitutional bar exists, whereas the
first three requirements are applicable more generally.
There are good reasons why Congress' spending powers should be limited
even in circumstances where some other head of power would enable Congress to achieve directly the same objective. Limitations on spending authority serve to reenforce the political protections that operate as the
principal safeguard against congressional overreaching. Conditional spending is particularly insidious because it often allows Congress to legislate
without clearly confronting the policy implications of its conduct and the
political costs associated with interference with local home rule. By creating
the illusion that it is doing no more than expanding the range of choice,
Congress can circumvent federalism limits that might be politically impregnable if it sought to achieve the same objectives by direct coercion.
Each of the three requirements imposed by the Supreme Court serve to
reestablish the political restraints that conditional spending weakens. Thus,
the general welfare requirement confronts Congress with the need to justify
its program in terms of the common good.7 8 Although not judicially en-

forceable, the requirement focuses the attention of Congress on its constitutional obligation not to override local control unless necessary to serve some
national public policy objective.79

Similarly, the "clear statement" rule with regard to the conditions requires Congress to bear the additional political costs of candor when it limits
local control. By forcing Congress to articulate its purpose, the rule tends to
prevent imposition of conditions that are the product of a back room deal
between private interest groups-the sort of deal that could not be publicly
defended if its terms were made explicit.
Finally, the "relatedness" requirement serves to protect against conditions
that amount to no more than the exercise of power over local entities rather
than efforts to advance some federal interest that transcends local concerns.
Insisting that the condition relate to the purposes of the program to which it
attaches provides assurance that Congress rationally linked the condition to
a public policy objective. Without the relatedness requirement, Congress
could use the threat of a fund cut off as a lever to change local policies that
77. Id. at 210-11.
78. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.

79. See, e.g., Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1691 -92 (1984) ("[T]he general welfare provision of the spending clause was designed to ensure

that public resources would be devoted to broad social interests.").
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have no nexus with national concerns. Congress could, in other words,
dominate rather than legislate.8 0
The manner in which the Armstrong amendment finally became law
makes clear that these dangers are not merely hypothetical. Had Congress
not utilized the appropriations process to work its will, the House and Senate District committees, which weigh the federal interest against the imperatives of home rule and determine public policy questions for the District,
might have considered the amendment."' Instead, Congress attached the
amendment to an omnibus appropriations measure on the floor of the Senate
at the final hour. 2 Congress had no need to focus on the federal interest
that justified congressional intervention because it did not relate the restriction to the specific purposes for which it was appropriating the money. Furthermore, because all of the District's funding was at stake, Congress could
80. The relatedness requirement is thus closely linked to both neo-republican and public
choice theories of politics. As Professor Sullivan argues:
A civic republican might defend the Court's attention to the germaneness of condition to benefit in the unconstitutional conditions context by arguing that benefits with
extraneous conditions attached are living proof of defective legislative process. They
are products of logrolling, or provisional alliances between factions with different
agendas. Only exercises of raw power, rather than deliberation over the common
good, engender such hybrid legislative creatures.
Sullivan, supra note 57, at 1471.
Similarly, for public choice theorists, the ability to impose extraneous conditions increases
the risk that rent seeking factions will capture the coercive power of government. See Farber
& Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 907 (1987) (rent-seeking
activities of special interest groups may undermine indirectly public confidence in the democratic process); Epstein, supra note 57, at 21-25 (indepth discussion of inequities in benefit
distribution which can result from rent-seeking activities of powerful interest groups); Sullivan,
supra note 57, at 1473 (germaneness requirement helps check rent-seeking activities).
Unfortunately, however, effective use of a relatedness requirement requires some preexisting
agreement on the appropriate purposes of particular government programs. For a discussion,
see Seidman, Reflections on Context and the Constitution, 73 MINN. L. REV. 73, 77-78 (1988)
(discussing a variety of congressional purposes). For a more comprehensive critique, see Sullivan, supra note 57, at 1473-77 (discussing various theories of germaneness).
81. Rule XXI of the House of Representatives and Rule XVI of the Senate make amendments proposing general legislation out of order when attached to appropriations measures.
See W. BROWN, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 248, 100th

Cong., 2d Sess. Rule XXI (1988); L.

SLACK, SENATE MANUAL,

S. Doc. No. 100-1, 100th

Cong., 1st Sess. Rule XVI (1988). Ironically, when the constitutionality of the Armstrong
amendment was challenged, the Federal Government defended it on the ground that these
rules would have prohibited the use of appropriations measures to accomplish "general legislation." Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Brief of the United
States Senate as Amicus Curiae at 9-10). But the relatedness requirement is important precisely because it forces the legislature to debate the substantive appropiateness of a restriction
rather than utilizing the simple expedient of conditioning essential funds on subservience to the
will of Congress.
82. Armstrong Amendment I, supra note 14, 102 Stat. at 2269-14.
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use its power to dominate the District without squarely confronting the implications of its actions for home rule. 3
All of the above suggests that even if Congress could have imposed directly the Armstrong amendment under its District clause power, it could
not do so through a conditional spending measure. Moreover, there is also a
second response to the argument that Congress' spending and direct powers
are coextensive. While no constitutional principle guarantees the right of
District citizens to an unamended Human Rights Ordinance, there is a
strong argument that District citizens did have a constitutional right to the
money that Congress withheld.
It is important to understand that the Armstrong amendment would have
gone beyond simply cutting off federal funds for the District. All money
spent by the District Government, including money raised by local taxes,
must be appropriated by Congress, and therefore all funds for all governmental functions would have been unavailable. 84 The District of Columbia
Government would simply have ceased to function.
In recent years, the contention that there is a constitutional right to minimal government services has not fared well in the Supreme Court.85 Once
again, however, the District clause puts this argument in a special light.
Under that clause, Congress is authorized to displace an existing state government in a territory ceded to it."6 Implicit within the right to accept the
cession is an obligation to create a government to stand in the stead of the
government that Congress displaced.
83. This is not to say that either the Senate and House rules or the relatedness requirements constitute impermeable barriers. In fact, after the court of appeals invalidated the Armstrong amendment, Clarke, 886 F.2d at 417, Congress reenacted it as a rider to the District's
annual appropriations in the form of a direct amendment to the District of Columbia Code.
See Armstrong Amendment II, supra note 14, § 141, 103 Stat. at 1284 (amending D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-2520 (1981 & Supp. 1989)). However, this subsequent history hardly demonstrates
that the limitations on conditional spending are pointless. It may be appropriate to erect spe-

cial political barriers to certain forms of legislation even though those barriers will on occasion
be overcome.

For a discussion of mechanisms by which Congress can avoid its own rules concerning
legislating through appropriations measures, see Schrag, supra note 10, at 333-35.
84. The District of Columbia Code makes clear that Congress must authorize and appropriate all funds for the District's budget, even when those funds are raised by local taxes. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-233 (1987). The Armstrong amendment, in turn, conditioned the appropria-

tion of all these funds on the Council's revision of the Human Rights Ordinance. Armstrong
Amendment II, supra note 14, 103 Stat. at 1284.
85. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winneabago County DSS, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989) ("[O]ur

cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property

interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.")
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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The new government may not be obliged to perform any particular services. For example, the government would have no duty to provide housing
for the homeless or a specified level of police protection. However, the constitutional language surely indicated that the Framers intended for Congress
to establish some sort of government. There is no indication that the Framers meant to permit Congress to return the federal district to a Hobbesian
state of nature. Yet this is precisely the result that the Armstrong amendment would have achieved had it taken effect.
Nor will it do to respond that the Armstrong amendment would not take
effect so long as the District Council capitulated by enacting the required
language. The right of District residents to some form of government is
unconditional. If it is unconstitutional for Congress to leave the District
without any form of government, then surely it is unconstitutional as well
for Congress to get its way by threatening to do something that it is not
permitted to do.
C.

Substantive Arguments

The analysis above is all premised on the unusual method that Congress
utilized to overturn the Human Rights Ordinance in the first Armstrong
amendment. Congress' direct amendment of the ordinance in response to
the court of appeals decision in Clarke rendered these arguments moot.
Congress' power over even the District, however, faces other substantive
limits and these limits render even the second Armstrong amendment vulnerable to constitutional attack.
1.

Establishment

The second Armstrong amendment leaves intact the District's Human
Rights Law insofar as it applies to educational institutions that are not religiously affiliated. 87 The amendment thus accords special benefits solely on
the basis of the religious affiliation of the institution. Given the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals decision in Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown
University,88 these special benefits cannot be defended on the ground that
they are constitutionally compelled under the free exercise clause. Can the
benefits be defended against the charge that they are constitutionally prohibited under the establishment clause?
There is a complex and not altogether consistent body of law concerning
the extent to which the Government may constitutionally accord special
87. See Armstrong Amendment II, supra note 14, at 103 Stat. 1284; see also D.C. CODE
§ 1-2520 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
88. 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. 1987); see also supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
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privileges to religious organizations as a means of accommodating religious
belief.8 9 The extent to which the Constitution permits such accommodation
in cases where it is not constitutionally compelled remains unsettled.9" One
principle, however, is clear: Congress may not specially benefit religious institutions in circumstances where the benefit does not serve to accommodate
religious belief.9 1
Yet the Armstrong amendment provides just such a benefit. The amendment grants all religious institutions a special right to discriminate against
gays regardless of whether the institution has a religious basis for the discrimination. Thus, a Quaker school with no religious objection to homosexuality nonetheless enjoys a special statutory privilege to fire homosexual
teachers simply because the school is religiously affiliated. This sort of unvarnished preference for religion over nonreligion in circumstances where
the preference does not serve to accommodate religious belief clearly violates
establishment clause principles.
It does not follow, of course, that all applications of the Armstrong
amendment violate the establishment clause. But interestingly, the amendment appears to be unconstitutional if applied to the specific case that motivated its passage. Following Georgetown, Georgetown University and the
plaintiffs entered a consent decree whereby the University agreed to provide
equal facilities and services to gay students. The University publicly stated
that the terms of the consent decree are consistent with Catholic tradition
89. For a summary, see G.
TUTIONAL LAW

STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN,

& M.

TUSHNET, CONSTI-

1418-23 (1986).

90. Compare, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of-Jesus Christ of Lat-

ter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of exception to ban
on employment discrimination for religious corporations with respect to employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corpo-

ration of its activities) with Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
(invalidating statute providing that no person who states that a particular day of the week is
observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on that day). See generally
McConnell, Accomodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (setting forth a framework to
distinguish legitimate accomodations for religion from unwarranted benefits for religion).
91. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating statute granting
churches special veto power over issuance of liquor licenses to restaurants within 500 feet of
church building). Cf Corporation of Presiding Bishop:
We find unpersuasive the District Court's reliance on the fact that § 702 singles out
religious entities for a benefit. Although the Court has given weight to this consideration in its past decisions .... it has never indicated that statutes that give special
consideration to religious groups are per se invalid ....
Where, as here, government
acts with the properpurpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion,
we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular
entities.

483 U.S. at 338 (emphasis added).
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and doctrine. 92 Hence, application of the Armstrong amendment to Georgetown would violate the establishment clause.
Moreover, even with regard to institutions that have religious objections
to the equal treatment of homosexuals, the Armstrong amendment raises
important establishment clause problems. The amendment leaves intact the

statutory ban against discrimination based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, and physical handicap even in
circumstances involving religious motivation for these other varieties of discrimination. Thus, the Armstrong amendment treats unequally different
religious groups based upon Congress' approval or disapproval of their beliefs. Groups that believe that homosexuality constitutes sinful behavior
have a special exemption from their statutory responsibilities. On the other
hand, groups that believe that interracial marriage is sinful (race), that God
intended women to remain at home to raise a family (sex and matriculation),
that men or women performing certain religious functions should remain
celibate (marital status), or that individuals should wear distinctive religious
garb (personal appearance) enjoy no such exemption. This sort of preference
for one religious belief over another, like the preference for religion over
93
nonreligion, violates core establishment clause principles.
2. Due Process
Not content to authorize discrimination against those who actually engage
in homosexual conduct, the authors of the Armstrong amendment extended
92. See Healy, supra note 37, at 457 (April 30, 1988):
In ... negotiations [with the student groups the university] had four principal purposes. The first was to make certain that the tangible benefits awarded by the court
did not include religious services, or access to the religious facilities and functions of
the University. The second objective was to make certain that Georgetown was not
used as a staging ground for non-University group activities. The third objective was
to avoid any direct advocacy of homosexual acts as well as to preserve the campus
from being the scene of any kind of activity that could, under normal canons, be
called improper or indecent. The fourth was to prevent any ambiguous use of the
University's name to imply that it approves of homosexual life styles as morally neutral. Over long and difficult negotiations, covering several months, the University
finally achieved an agreement with the plaintiffs that was presented to the trial court
as an agreed-upon order for it to use. In the order as it stands, all four of the major
goals the University sought in these negotiations are achieved.
93. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3107 (1989) ("Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean ... it certainly means at the
very least that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or
creed .... 'The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.' " (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
244 (1982))).
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their exemption to persons "promoting, encouraging, or condoning" such
conduct. 94 Nor is the amendment limited to the promotion, encouragement,
or condonation of actual homosexual conduct. Its ambit extends to homosexual "lifestyle, orientation, or belief."9 5 Read literally, the Armstrong
amendment authorizes discrimination against an individual who has homosexual urges that are never acted upon (orientation) or even a homosexual
"belief," whatever that is, that does not rise to the level of an orientation.
Worse yet, the amendment appears to authorize discrimination against a
heterosexual who silently condones a homosexual belief.
If the amendment imposed governmental discrimination on these
grounds, no doubt it would be unconstitutional. Fundamental and uncontroversial constitutional principles shield individual belief and orientation
from government scrutiny and disapproval. 96 Of course, the Armstrong
amendment does no more than authorize private discrimination. It might
therefore be thought that the state action doctrine would shield the amendment from constitutional attack. But despite the private source of the discrimination, the State is the entity that is distinguishing between individuals
based upon their orientations or beliefs, and this distinction is simply irrational. No imaginable legitimate basis exists on which a State could become
involved with what "orientation" or unacted upon belief an individual possesses. Thus, although Congress might repeal the Human Rights Ordinance
altogether,97 it cannot distinguish between those covered and not covered in
a fashion that irrationally trenches upon private orientations and beliefs.
3.

Equal Protection

In a series of cases decided over the past two decades, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the government violates equal protection principles when it restructures its political system in a fashion that impairs the
ability of minorities to secure legislation in their interest.9 8 The most recent
articulation of this proposition came in a case raising issues closely analo94. Armstrong Amendment II, supra note 14, at 103 Stat. at 1284.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) ("Whatever the power of the
state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.")
97. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
98. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969) (amendment to city charter that required any ordinance enacted by the city
council regulating property based on race to be approved by a majority of the electors held an
unconstitutional impediment to equal protection); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(affirming the judgment of the California Supreme Court that held that a state statute authorizing racial discrimination in the housing market significantly involved the state in private
discrimination).
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gous to those posed by the Armstrong amendment, Washington v. Seattle
School District.99
a. Washington v. Seattle School District
In Seattle, the City of Seattle decided voluntarily to embark upon a program of extensive busing to increase racial balance in its schools.' °° In response to this program, the citizens of Washington adopted a state-wide
initiative that terminated the use of mandatory busing and deprived local
jurisdictions of the power to use busing to remedy de facto racial segregation
not violative of the Constitution.l1 The school district brought suit alleging
that the initiative violated the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that Seattle had no constitutional obligation to embark upon
the busing program in the first place, and further acknowledged that the city
could abandon the program even after it started, but nonetheless held that
the initiative violated the equal protection clause.102
Writing for a five justice majority,' 3 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the
state wide initiative amounted to more than a mere repeal of the Seattle
program. The initiative, the Court held, had the effect of erecting special
barriers for racial minorities attempting to secure legislation in their interests." Whereas citizens favoring other school programs could work their
will by persuading the Seattle School Board to adopt their point of view, the
initiative singled out the advocates of racial balance and forced them to prevail in a new state wide initiative before they could secure relief.0 °5
In most important respects, the Armstrong amendment resembles the initiative invalidated in Seattle. In both cases, a local jurisdiction embarked on
a voluntary plan to protect the interests of a minority group. In neither case
did the beneficiaries of the program enjoy a constitutional right to this protection. In both cases, a larger jurisdiction, enjoying hierarchical authority
over the local jurisdiction, enacted a measure to repeal the plan. And in
99. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).

100. Id. at 461.
101. Id. at 462-64. See also Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.26.010 (1981) (granting students the
right to attend the school that is geographically nearest the student's residence).
102. 458 U.S. at 487. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-

ington held that the initiative amounted to an impermissible racial classification violative of the
fourteenth amendment, Seattle School Dist. v. State, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1012 (W.D. Wash.

1979), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision
based on that rationale, Seattle School Dist. v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir.
1980), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
103. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Stevens joined.
104. 458 U.S. at 470.
105. Id. at 474-75.
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both cases, this repealer effectively restructured the political process in a
fashion that specially disabled the minority group.
Thus, advocates of a wide variety of measures relating to education and
nondiscrimination need only convince a majority of the District Council to
enact legislation favoring their interests. However, just as advocates of racial integration bore the special burden of prevailing on a state wide basis in
Seattle, advocates of gay rights bear the unique burden of persuading Congress to repeal the Armstrong amendment.
Seattle does seem to present a stronger case for the plaintiffs in one respect: the case involved a racial minority and therefore might be thought to
engender suspect class analysis.' °6 Although the Justices have not yet
squarely addressed the question, the present Supreme Court probably would
not hold that homosexuals constitute a suspect class or that laws dis10 7
advantaging them automatically trigger strict scrutiny.
Although this distinction weakens the claim of opponents of the Armstrong amendment, it does not destroy it. Interestingly, the Seattle initiative
was also racially neutral. The initiative politically disadvantaged advocates
of integrated schools. As the Court acknowledged,'
this class, like the
class of opponents of integration, consisted of whites and blacks. It may also
be true that the primary beneficiary of integration is the class of racial minorities. Yet this fact, even if it is true, demonstrates no more than the disproportionate racial impact of the Seattle repeal. And, the Court has made
plain that disproportionate racial impact alone is insufficient to generate
heightened scrutiny when the challenged classification is facially neutral.' 09
Thus, the result in Seattle cannot be explained on the theory that the initiative discriminated racially. Rather, the result depends upon the Court's
perception that support for the initiative derived, at least in part, from a
106. Thus, although the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance erecting special barriers
to statutes outlawing racial discrimination in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), the
Court declined to invalidate a statute establishing similar barriers to the construction of low
income housing in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The Court held that the statute
involved in James did not racially classify because it "require[d] referendum approval for any
low-rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority. And the record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face
is in fact aimed at a racial minority." Id. at 141.
107. Arguably, the Court implicitly resolved this quetion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986). In Bowers, although purporting to address only a due process attack on Georgia's
sodomy statute, the Court upheld the act as applied to homosexuals while leaving open the
question of its constitutionality as applied to heterosexuals. Id. at 188 n.2.
108. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472.
109. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1979) (refusing to invalidate qualifying test for District of Columbia police officers merely because the test had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities).
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desire to use political power to entrench existing power relationships. Even
if the proponents of busing were not all white, there was an unacceptable
risk that prejudice against powerless subgroups in the population motivated
the advocates of the initiative. Rather than engage in meaningful dialogue
with these subgroups, the State of Washington simply restructured the political process to make it unnecessary to bargain with them."o
It need hardly be demonstrated that fear of association with homosexuals,
like fear of association with blacks, often stems from prejudice."' And
although there are both heterosexual and homosexual advocates of the
Human Rights Ordinance, the Armstrong amendment, like the Seattle initiative, effectively ends the political bargaining over a matter vital to a scorned
minority group.1 12 Both measures stack the political deck in advance so as
to permit the untrammelled exercise of political power.
b.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

That the Court does not treat homosexuals as a suspect class, which
would trigger heightened scrutiny, does not dispose of the potential constitutional issues. The Court's treatment of an analogous claim advanced by a
group of mentally retarded citizens in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. 13 makes clear that suspect class status will not settle the question of political domination. In Cleburne, the Court explained at length why
the mentally retarded were not a suspect class and why legislation facially
discriminating against them need only satisfy a "rational basis" test.'' 4
However, after justifying the use of rational basis, the Court nonetheless held
that the exercise of raw political power over this group violated the Constitution when the contested discriminating measure reflected no more than a
visceral dislike of a group of citizens."'
110. For an analysis of Seattle along similar lines, see generally Sunstein, Public Values,
Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 127.

111. For a discussion, see J.

ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

162-64 (1980).

112. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
113. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
114. Id. at 442-447.
115. Id. at 448:
[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the
like. It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise,
could not order city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause ....
and the City
may not avoid the strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of
some faction of the body politic. "Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
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For two reasons, there are special risks that the Armstrong amendment
violated the Seattle-Cleburne principle. First, although racial prejudice
motivates many opponents of integration, many others have nonracial
grounds for opposition. The existence of a legitimate public policy debate
concerning the efficacy and wisdom of governmental efforts to end de facto
segregation compounds the Seattle analysis.
By contrast, it is far less likely that the Armstrong amendment reflected a
legitimate stance on public policy. Importantly, the antidiscrimination requirement that the Armstrong amendment nullified did not preclude educational institutions from discriminating along the statutory lines in
circumstances where a nexus existed between the classification and the aims
of the institution. Although the coverage of the District of Columbia
Human Rights Ordinance is extraordinarily broad, its substantive prohibitions are quite narrow.'16 The ordinance applies to discrimination on the
basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, political affiliation, source of income, or physical handicap.""' 7 It does not follow,
however, that exclusion of individuals in these groups necessarily violates
the ordinance. The statute's preamble states that it is aimed solely at "discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit."" 8 Moreover, the specific provision covering educational institutions makes it
unlawful to deny access or services "to any person otherwise qualified,
wholly or partially, for a discriminatory reason" based upon the forbidden
categories. ' 9
The Human Rights Ordinance thus permits distinctions so long as they
relate to an individual's qualifications and are not motivated by a desire to
discriminate simpliciter. It would seem to follow that the congressional annulment of the provision did not advance any public policy that could be
disentangled from mere visceral, private dislike. Rather, the Armstrong
amendment only authorizes the kind of naked discrimination that the ordi116.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1987).

117.

Id.

118. Id. § 1-2501 (emphasis added).
119. Id. § 1-2520 (1) (emphasis added). The ordinance provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
To deny, restrict or abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any of [an educational institution's] facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or
partially,for a discriminatory reason, based upon the race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, political affiliation, source of income or physical handicap of any
individual.
Id. (emphasis added).
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nance prohibits. But Cleburne and Seattle dictate that public policy must be
more than a reflection of visceral dislike and prejudice. 12 °
There is also a second respect in which the Armstrong amendment poses a
clearer case for application of the Seattle-Cleburneprinciple than Seattle or
Cleburne themselves. In both Seattle and Cleburne a fancy argument is required to explain exactly how the political process was restructured so as to
disadvantage a minority group. In both cases, opponents of the decisions
could fairly claim that a neutral process was employed, and no restructuring
had occurred. Thus, both before and after passage of the initiative invalidated in Seattle, the school board's actions were subject to repeal through
the initiative process. That process was open to advocates of school integration as well as to its opponents. Had the votes been available, it could have
been used to entrench the Seattle busing plan. Indeed, busing proponents
could have used the initiative process to repeal the contested initiative. It is
therefore hard to see how busing proponents can claim anything more dramatic than the loss of an election that they wish they had won.
Recasting the Cleburne result in political process terms presents even
more problems. Perhaps the Cleburne City Council was at least partially
motivated by stereotypical judgments and outright prejudice against the
mentally retarded. Nonethless, those judgments did not foreclose formal access to the political process. For all that appears in the Supreme Court's
opinion, the retarded and their advocates were free to elect different representatives with different attitudes toward their interests. There are, of
course, obvious respects in which mental retardation itself can prevent full
political participation.' 2 1 In addition, sophisticated arguments drawn from
political theory explain how groups with equal formal access to the ballot
can nonetheless be frozen out of the process. 1 2 2 However, those arguments
are controversial, and nothing in the Court's opinion defends or even explains them.
By contrast, the political process argument regarding the Armstrong
amendment is simple and uncontroversial. Congress not only partially re120. See supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
121. As Justice Marshall argued in his separate opinion in Cleburne:
As of 1979, most States still categorically disqualified "idiots" from voting, without
regard to individual capacity and with discretion to exclude left in the hands of lowlevel election officials. Not until Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped
Act . . . were "the door[s] of public education" opened wide to handicapped children ....
But most important, lengthy and continuing isolation of the retarded has
perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and stereotyping that long have plagued
them.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (citations omitted).
122. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 11, at 135-179.
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pealed the Human Rights Ordinance; it also transferred the controversy
about future reenactment of the amendment to itself, a legislative body in
123
which the District proponents of reenactment had no representation.
Thus Congress formally and totally precluded further debate about the
matter.
4. Anti-Domination
At first blush, the various arguments advanced above may appear both
discrete and, for the most part, not subject to generalization. Even if correct,
those arguments seem to be peculiarly applicable to the controversy surrounding the Armstrong amendment and, therefore, fail to demonstrate that
an adequate legal foundation supports the protection of home rule over the
range of cases.
There are two responses to this argument. First, even if the substantive
arguments set out above are peculiarly applicable to the Armstrong legislation, there is no reason to suppose that the case itself is atypical. Therefore it
is likely that competent lawyering could produce comparable, albeit different, arguments to combat other threats to home rule.
Second, and more fundamentally, the substantive arguments advanced
above are neither discrete nor limited to this particular case. Although
drawn from different clauses of the Constitution and applied to a particular
set of facts, the arguments, on closer analysis, really amount to reiterations
of a single basic theme with broad applicability.
The claim underlying each of the arguments is that the Armstrong
amendment demonstrates contempt for the District and for its citizens. This
contempt is expressed by the sloppy, thoughtless, and overbroad way in
which Congress drafted the amendment, the backdoor means which led to
its enactment, and the bullying technique Congress utilized to secure its
goals. The Constitution does not permit the government to show contempt
for its citizens even when, indeed, especially when, they are excluded from
the political process. The proponents of the law must therefore demonstrate
that the law amounts to something more than an act of domination over a
powerless and despised minority. If a fully representative legislature
never
24
would have enacted the law, then the law is unconstitutional.
123. Armstrong Amendment II, supra note 14, at 103 Stat. at 1284.
124. The anti-domination principle closely tracks neo-Republican theory, which sees constitutional law as a guarantee of authentic dialogue designed to discover the public good and
rejects raw political power as a legitimate ground for state intervention. See, e.g., Sunstein,
supra note 79. Yet the anti-domination principle also draws upon pluralist theory, the princi-

pal modern rival of neo-republicanism. The principle reflects pluralist theory because it is
premised upon a supposed failure of group representation and asks us to imagine the results of
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Strands of legal doctrine concerning the District directly embody this
anti-domination principle. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the principle
is in an opinion written almost twenty years ago by a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In United States v.
Thompson, 125 the court held that in light of the lack of congressional representation of District residents, the judiciary had a special responsibility to
prevent the District from becoming " 'the last plantation.' "126 Therefore,
laws discriminating against District residents should be subject to "the
strictest possible review.'" 2 7 Utilizing this standard of review, the Court
held that providing less favorable terms for release on bail for defendants
charged with national crimes in the District than for defendants charged
with identical crimes elsewhere in the country would violate the
1 28
Constitution.
But although an anti-domination principle serves to unify the various arguments made above, the principle also makes all of the arguments vulnerable. Because all of the arguments ultimately rest upon a single principle, a
judge who rejected that principle would reject each of its elaborations as
well.
In fact, the anti-domination principle is vulnerable to two sorts of attack.
First, a critic might question the ability of judges to make accurate distinctions between statutes that are authentic efforts to articulate public policy
and those that constitute mere acts of domination. The peculiar facts of
Thompson made an especially compelling case for a finding of domination.
Congress had discriminated between defendants who were charged with
identical national offenses solely on the basis of the fact that the United
States attorney tried some of the defendants in the voteless District of Columbia.1 29 Yet even on these unusual facts, one could easily quarrel with the
conclusion that this differentiation amounted to domination. For example,
a hypothetical, fair political process which fairly represented all interests. Cf J. ELY, supra
note 11, at 162-64.
125. 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 (1972).
126. Id. at 1346 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 1341. The court concluded that:
The principle of majority rule loses its legitimacy when not all the votes are
counted. . . . In this context, at least, the normal arguments for judicial restraint
become no more than hollow shibboleths grotesquely detached from the logic which
once supported them. There is no reason to pay deference to the views of a representative body which does not in fact represent those against whom it is discriminating.
Therefore, discriminatory classifications affecting District residents must be subject
to the strictest possible review.
Id. (citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1341.
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opponents of the decision could plausibly argue that a legitimate public policy supported the distinction. In the District, unlike any state, Congress
controlled both the local and the national court system and, therefore, could
impose uniform rules upon both. 131
In situations similar to that posed by the Armstrong amendment, where
no overt discrimination against District residents of the sort presented by
Thompson exists, and where Congress purports to exercise its local authority, the effort to distinguish between domination and legislation becomes far
more difficult and, perhaps, altogether impossible. Such an effort requires
judges to imagine a fully representational, hypothetical political process with
participants authentically committed to discovering and implementing the
public good. Then judges must predict what legislation such a process
would produce. Since no such process has ever existed, judges making such
predictions are not subject to any reality testing. Therefore, more than a
small risk exists that their predictions will amount to no more than a substitution of their own preference for that of the legislature.
A second sort of critique is more radical. It attacks not just the ability of
judges to identify acts of domination but also the very coherence of the concept. According to this view, there is no neutral method by which one can
differentiate between a legitimate resolution of a public policy dispute on the
one hand and an act of domination on the other. All public policy amounts
to nothing more than the assertion of power by the winners of the political
struggle against the losers. ' Thus, no one resolution of a public policy
dispute is normatively more legitimate than any other resolution.
130. The Thompson Court reasoned that this argument missed the point:
It is clearly within congressional power to enact special rules for the District to deal
with street crimes which it prosecutes nowhere else. But the Government would
have us believe that there is justification for special rules in the District for crimes
prosecuted in every federal jurisdiction. That proposition is an entirely different matter, and its truth is hardly self-evident.
Id. at 1339 (footnote omitted). However, the Thompson argument may, itself, miss the point.
The District is arguably unique because Congress has the power to make uniform bail standards for "local" and "national" crimes only in the District. Cf United States v. Cohen, 733
F.2d 128, 139-141 (1984) (Wilkey, J., concurring) (reasoning that uniform insanity procedures
throughout the federal system but different in the District would accord District violators
unequal protection).
131. See, e.g., Posner, The DeFunis Case and the ConstitutionalityofPreferential Treatment

of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1. Judge Posner reasons that:
The public-interest theory ... is under increasing, and increasingly effective, attack
as lacking a good analytical basis and contrary to actual experience with governmental policies and programs. Many public policies are better explained as the outcome
of a pure power struggle - clothed in a rhetoric of public interest that is a mere
figleaf - among narrow interest or pressure groups. The ability of such groups to
obtain legislation derives from their money, votes, cohesiveness, ability to make cred-
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In recent years, these two arguments have led many to abandon the quest
for noncontroversial normative principles outside the political process by
which that process can be judged. This new skepticism diminishes substantially the chances that one or more of the previous arguments would prevail.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in an en banc opinion written by Judge Scalia, has effectively overruled
Thompson and disavowed the notion that the District's disfranchisement justifies special judicial oversight.1 32 Judge Scalia's argument for this result
rested heavily on his skepticism concerning the possibility of discovering and
implementing normative standards that exist outside of politics by which
political outcomes could be judged.13 3

Therefore, arguments resting on the anti-domination principle may not
ultimately prevail. But, the crucial point is this: without such a principle,the
District's status would remain unchanged even if it secured statehood. The
legal guarantee of unconditional state sovereignty also rests on the anti-domination principle. Thus, without such a principle, statehood would be useless, while with it, statehood would be unnecessary. The next section
explores the reasons for this conclusion as well as the results that flow from
it.
III.

THE CONDITIONALITY OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Suppose the District of Columbia somehow managed to attain statehood.
Would the fact of statehood standing alone provide additional legal protection against enactment of a new Armstrong amendment?
There was a time when the answer almost surely would have been "yes."
The United States Supreme Court thought that a line existed between national and local matters and that it was able to discern the precise location of
ible threats of violence or other disorder if their demands are not met, and other
factors all totally unrelated to the abstract merit of the policy at issue.
Id. at 27. For a representative sample of the literature supporting this view, see Id. at 27, n.50.
132. Cohen, 733 F.2d at 128.
133. Id. at 139. For example, Judge Scalia eschewed any effort to determine whether there
is a reasonable basis for treating District citizens differently from citizens in other parts of the
country. Id. Instead, he was prepared to assume the legitimacy of differential treatment from
the mere fact that Congress had special authority to legislate for the District. This grant of
power meant that "in a sense the Constitution itself establishes the rationality of the present
classification, by providing a separate federal power which reaches only the present group."
Id. Thus, at least with regard to discrimination against District residents, Judge Scalia opted
for the positivest view. His position amounted to a refusal to apply any normative standard to

laws that differentiate between District residents and residents of the rest of the country. Id.
For the classic discussion of the positivist position, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
92-93 (1981). For a discussion of constitutional positivism, see Wasserstrom & Seidman, The
Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 87-103 (1988).
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Eventually, however, it came to be seen that the maps

used to locate the boundary bore a remarkable resemblance to the platform
of the Republican Party and almost no resemblance to the constitutional
text. With that realization came the more or less complete collapse of the
135
effort to enforce judicially federalism constraints against Congress.
Thus, the modem Court would ask only whether Congress could rationally believe that the regulation in question related to one of the powers entrusted to it under article I of the Constitution. 136 For a half century, not a
single congressional enactment has managed to fail this test.
Given this extremely lenient standard of review, Congress could easily justify a new Armstrong amendment as an exercise of Congress' commerce
clause powers. Under current precedent, it does not matter that Congress
enacted the statute primarily for a moral or social purpose. So long as the
statute regulates an area that, in the aggregate, might rationally be supposed
to have an effect on interstate commerce, Congress' purpose in enacting the
statute is irrelevant. 137 Such an effect could easily be found. For example,
different state laws concerning homosexuality and religion might well influ-

ence decisions concerning the location of businesses and workers, thereby
3
distorting the free flow of capital.' 1

Perhaps this position seems unconvincing, but the argument is in fact no
more farfetched than other commerce clause arguments that the Court has
accepted regularly for fifty years. Moreover, even if the commerce clause
argument does not carry the day, that hardly ends the matter. A new Arm134. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
135. For an account, see G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note
89, at 166-81.
136. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) ("But where we find
that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation
is at an end.").
137. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Heart of
Atlanta, the Supreme Court held:
[tihat Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered
its enactment no less valid. In framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing
with what it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the
overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on
commercial intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to enact
appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress
was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce
with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.
Id. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (aggregating effects to meet interstate
commerce threshold).
138. The Court accepted an analogous argument with regard to the manufacture of goods
by workers paid substandard wages. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
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strong amendment could also be seen as a congressional effort to implement
the due process guarantee of religious freedom incorporated in section one of
the fourteenth amendment and made an appropriate subject for congressional action by section five.1 39 And, if all else failed, a congressional funding limitation analogous to the Armstrong amendment might well survive as
a legitimate exercise of Congress' spending clause authority even if the limitation was unrelated to any of the substantive areas of congressional
power.'4°
For a brief period, some thought that the more general principle implicit
in the tenth amendment supplemented the federalism protections that the
enumeration of only specific rubrics of federal authority in Article I provided. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 141 the Court held that this
more amorphous principle prohibited regulation of a State qua State in circumstances where federal regulation interfered with a traditional governmental function and impinged on attributes of state sovereignty.' 42
If National League of Cities had remained good law, it conceivably might
have saved a state legislature from the ultimate indignity imposed on the
District's Council of being compelled to enact the statutory language of the
Armstrong amendment. But the regime of National League of Cities protected States only against federal regulation directed expressly at the States
themselves.' 4 3 The states, therefore, would have been defenseless had Congress itself chosen to enact the Armstrong language.
Moreover, National League of Cities is no longer good law. The Court
squarely overruled the decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority. ' Significantly, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in
Garcia explicitly embraced the twin critiques of the anti-domination principle outlined above. Thus, the Court rejected National League of Cities in
part because it doubted the capability of the judiciary to locate correctly the
139. See Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §§ 1, 5.
140. In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the Court rejected the Madisonian position, which would have read the Constitution as limiting the congressional spending power to

purposes related to the other specific heads of authority contained in article I. Id. at 65-66.
Instead, the Court embraced the Hamiltonian view, which treated the taxing and spending
authority as a wholly independent grant of power. Id. at 66. See also supra notes 56-87 and
accompanying text.

141. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
142. 426 U.S. at 840-52.
143. Thus, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), the Court
distinguished National League of Cities and upheld a federal statute imposing certain require-

ments on strip mine operators because the statute's command ran to private individuals, rather
than to the state itself. Id. at 283-93.
144. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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appropriate boundary between state and federal sovereignty. The Court
noted that:
Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.
We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause
powers over the States merely by relying on a prioridefinitions of
state sovereignty.
In short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions
of state sovereignty when
measuring congressional authority under
45
the Commerce Clause. 1
At the same time, Justice Blackmun also seemed to embrace the more radical critique by suggesting that no normative standard outside of political
outcomes existed to judge those outcomes.
[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special
restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in
the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system than by
46
judicially created limitations on federal power.'
The anti-domination principle simply cannot survive this sort of skepticism
concerning the possibilities of principled judicial review. Yet, without the
anti-domination principle, State sovereignty, like the District's sovereignty
in the absence of home rule, is conditional and revocable.
It might still be argued that statehood would provide the District with a
modicum of legal protection by disabling Congress from enforcing special
rules against the District that Congress would not impose on the rest of the
country. Perhaps statehood would deprive Congress of the ability to capitalize.on the District's marginal status so as to "make an example" of it.' 4 7
Garcia provides some support for this view. Although generally disclaiming a role for the Courts in enforcing federalism limitations, Justice Blackmun hints that judicial intervention might remain appropriate in
circumstances where a breakdown in the political process is the sole cause
145. Id. at 546, 548, 550.
146. Id. at 552.
147. See Schrag, supra note 10, at 345-50.
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of the federal encroachment. "Any substantive restraint on the exercise of
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature
of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible
failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.' ,,4' Unfortunately, Justice Blackmun failed to

elaborate on the type of political failing he had in mind. Perhaps he conceived of a situation in which the other States took advantage of their political power to impose limitations on certain disfavored geographic areas that
those States were unwilling to live with themselves.
The possibility that this sort of "equal protection for states" principle
would provide meaningful protection for District home rule, is dubious,
however. First, the very factors that make the District politically marginal
in the first place will also sometimes allow Congress to impose uniform rules
that vitally affect the District but have a minimal impact on the states. For
example, only one state prohibits educational institutions from discriminating against homosexuals.' 49 Thus, Congress could give the Armstrong
amendment national scope without significantly impinging on the sovereignty of the states.
Second, even if Congress singled out the District for special treatment, no
Supreme Court case has held that discrimination among states is unconstitutional.' 5 ° On the contrary, the Court has permitted such discrimination
even in the teeth of the express constitutional requirement of uniformity in
the areas of bankruptcy and taxation.'5 Moreover, the Framer's decision to
include an express textual limitation in these two areas fairly implies that the
148.
149.

Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
Currently, Wisconsin is the only state that prohibits educational institutions from dis-

crimination against homosexuals. However, some twenty-three municipalities and counties
scattered throughout the country have similar bans. See Leonard, Gay & Lesbian Rights Protection in the U.S.: An Introduction to Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights 2-3 (pamphlet published
by National Gay & Lesbian Task Force).

150. See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939). In Currin, the Court held:
To hold that Congress in establishing its regulation is restricted to the making of
uniform rules would be to impose a limitation which the Constitution does not pre-

scribe. There is no requirement of uniformity in connection with the commerce
power . . .such as there is with respect to the power to lay duties, imposts and

excises ....Congress may choose the commodities and places to which its regulation
shall apply.

Id. at 14 (citations omitted). Of course, Congress' choice of areas within which it regulates
must be rational. This standard, however, is easily met with regard to social and economic
legislation. See generally Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination,Equal Protection, and Self-determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987).

151. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84-86 (1983) (upholding special tax treatment for Alaskan oil); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159-61 (1974)

(holding that uniformity provision of bankrupcy clause does not require invalidation of geographically defined class of debtors).
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Framer's did not anticipate that Congress would be so limited when it legislates in other areas.
Finally, any effort to implement a nondiscrimination principle would have
to come to grips with the very problems that caused the Court to abandon
the National League of Cities approach in the first place. A court attempting
to apply this principle would have to decide whether the state-specific legislation in fact resulted from a breakdown in the political process as opposed
to the outcome of a good-faith dialogue about appropriate public policy. A
court could, of course, announce a bright-line rule that prohibited facial
state-specific discrimination. Congress, however, could easily circumvent
such a rule by state-neutral gerrymanders. For example, Congress could
pass an Armstrong amendment applicable to all states in which the federal
government employs more than a certain percentage of the populace. The
Court could outlaw gerrymanders as well, but any effort to distinguish between gerrymanders and legitimate classifications must rest upon some normative framework separate from the outcomes of the political process, the
very kind of framework that Garcia rejected.
Thus, it seems to follow that even if the District were a State, with all the
legal protections that statehood entails, the District's sovereignty would remain conditional and revocable and it would suffer from the same sense of
powerlessness and vulnerability that accompanies its present status.
And yet this conclusion seems seriously askew. There may remain a few
extreme advocates of states rights who claim that current Supreme Court
precedent has effectively abrogated the sovereignty of the States. But most
fair minded observers would reject the proposition that the States today are
not self-governing. Although the appropriate breadth of federalism constraints on Congress remains an issue in modem political discourse, the
"home rule" question is, at a minimum, less pressing for Utah or New Jersey
15 2
than it is for the District.
If the States have little more legal protection than the District, what explains this difference in perception? For the Garcia majority, the answer was
simple: the primary protection for state sovereignty is political rather than
152. As Professor Choper writes:
[T]he proliferation of national programs has neither led to a centralized autocracy
nor resulted in the total concentration of federal power to the exclusion of the individual states. As illustrated by the prolonged constitutional debates in Congress that
delayed passage of the Sherman Act for several years and the stalled desperately
needed antilynching laws and civil rights legislation for too many more, Congress has
generally paid fastidious attention to the notion that certain government powers are
reserved to the states:
J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 186 (1980) (foot-

note omitted).
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legal. The protection is built into the structure of the federal system, and
153
therefore does not need to be enforced from outside by judicial review.
The next section argues that state sovereignty is indeed a political fact.
But the nature of the political protection enjoyed by the States is at once
more subtle and more difficult to replicate than the GarciaCourt might have
supposed.
IV.

POLITICS AND HOME RULE

On the simplest level, the political system protects state sovereignty from
federal encroachment by providing for state representation in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate. The residents of the District of
Columbia do not enjoy this right of representation. The most immediate and
dramatic consequence of statehood would be to provide the District with a
Representative and two Senators who could protect the District's interest
with something more than moral suasion.
It hardly follows, however, that formal representation provides adequate
protection against domination. There is no "invisible hand" that magically
assures that two Senators and a Representative in the House provide just the
degree of political representation needed to ward off efforts to assert raw
political power over District residents. If enough representatives from other
States undervalue the welfare of inhabitants of the District, or do not bother
with a dialogue with District representatives concerning the public good,
then they will simply outvote the District's representatives.154
Of course, there are ways in which even small minorities in Congress can
assert significant political power. Senators and Representatives do more
than cast isolated and discrete votes on legislation. A full description of the
changes that voting representation would bring must take into account the
additional political power that stems from specialization and logrolling.
Specialization occurs because members of Congress must allocate their
limited time and energy. Members from the District might well choose to
serve on committees affecting District affairs and to develop expertise in
matters of interest to District residents. This choice would enhance their
153. See supra text accompanying note 146.
154. Indeed, there is some reason to suppose that voting representation in Congress might
diminish the District's ability to withstand incursions on home rule. Ironically, the District
currently enjoys a modicum of protection stemming from its disfranchisement. The lack of
voting representatives allows the District to argue with special force that inroads into home
rule violate fundamental postulates of democracy. Full voting representation would seal off
this argument. The "equal vote" of District Representatives and Senators on legislation affecting home rule might serve to legitimate adverse outcomes that cannot presently be defended.
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power to protect home rule at the expense of their influence on matters less
important to their constituents. 155
Logrolling really amounts to no more than a complicated variant on the
specialization theme. Members of Congress not only decide how to vote on
isolated pieces of legislation but also trade votes across issues. This ability to
logroll provides a measure of protection for even small minorities by reflecting the intensity of preference held by these minorities regarding particular
issues.' 5 6 Thus, District representatives might trade their votes on matters
about which they care little for the votes of others on home rule issues.
Without doubt, specialization and logrolling would enhance the ability of
District representatives to protect home rule. Certainly other states, even
very small states, have used these techniques very effectively to achieve their
ends. It is therefore possible that full voting representation for the District
would make all the difference. These results, however, are not inevitable.
Although other states may have been successful in magnifying their political
power through logrolling and specialization, they were able to do so only
because they could find partners with whom to bargain. If the barriers that
separate the District from the rest of the country are high enough, a similar
set of partners may simply not be forthcoming.
A.

Specialization

If home rule were to remain continually under attack, District representatives might be forced to devote a disproportionate amount of their time and
resources to maintaining self-government. Perhaps they could stave off the
worst incursions, but only at the cost of their effectiveness with regard to
other issues. By contrast, representatives from the older states certainly do
not devote a comparable amount of energy to the defense of their state sovereignty. Thus, the price of home rule might be relative disfranchisement on
other national issues.
Moreover, even if District representatives succeeded in strategically positioning themselves so as to exercise disproportionate power with respect to
home rule issues, it is uncertain that they could be relied upon to exercise
that power. The very specialization that would enhance their ability to defend home rule might also reduce their incentives to do so. This conclusion
follows because transferring issues to the national level would tend to maxi155. See, e.g., L.

SALAMON,

THE MONEY COMMITTEES 26-83 (1975); L. DEXTER, THE

SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICS OF CONGRESS

137-38 (1969).

156. For an introductory discussion of ways in which intense and concentrated preferences
can prevail even when they are in the minority, see Gwartney & Wagner, Public Government,
in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 19-22 (Gwartney & Wagner, eds.

1988).
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mize the power of the representatives, including representatives of the District, who specialize in those issues. Thus, the specialization of District
representatives might actually contribute to the tendency to treat District
issues on a national level.
B.

Logrolling

Logrolling works only in circumstances where votes are required at the
margin. Because the District would have only one vote in the House and
two in the Senate, the margin on which it operated would be very small
indeed. Unlike states with much larger delegations or with more allies, its
votes would be necessary only in cases where Congress was very closely divided. Moreover, even in these circumstances, the ability of District representatives to protect home rule through logrolling would be sharply
circumscribed. For a number of reasons, logrolling requires a kind of discipline that is very difficult to enforce.
Representatives proposing a logroll must have the political freedom to
trade their votes in exchange for home rule protection. District representatives, however, are likely to be severely hampered on both ends of the trade.
With respect to issues of little importance to the District, representatives
may be restricted by the ideological commitments of their constituents.
Even if a particular issue has little real impact on District residents, a vote
can have important symbolic significance, and this symbolism can have real
political consequences. 5 7 This problem is particularly acute because logrolling has negative connotations in our political culture. A representative
who makes a trade to protect home rule may face criticism that he will be
unable to rebut with a candid explanation of the gains realized from the
trade.
With respect to the other end of the trade, the problem is that every such
issue really involves two separate questions: the home rule question, and the
merits question. For example, the Armstrong amendment has caused controversy both with respect to the District's home rule and with respect to the
appropriate trade off between the right of homosexuals to equal treatment
and the right of religious institutions to pursue their mission.
Although the constituents of District representatives are likely to be
united on the home rule issue, they will often be divided on the merits, and
this division may undermine the freedom of the representatives to effect a
157. For example, the actual impact of a congressional ban on the use of District funds for
abortions performed on women who have been raped may be very slight. But the ideological
and symbolic significance of the ban may prevent District representatives from trading off this
issue in exchange for other benefits.
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logroll. Thus, when a local group loses a political struggle within the District, the group may be tempted to ally itself with national forces so as to
reverse this defeat by undermining home rule. It will require extraordinary
discipline to force this group to give up on the prospect of a short term
victory on the merits for the sake of a more abstract victory on the principle
of home rule. Because each reversal of District policy erodes home rule only
incrementally, serious free rider problems may arise with any effort to enforce home rule discipline against local groups tempted with the immediate
prospect of winning on the merits.
There are also problems in enforcing discipline among the "purchasers" of
votes from the District. The fact that trades are seldom completed simultaneously creates enforcement problems. The District representative cannot
know that the Iowa delegation will make good on its promise to support
home rule in exchange for votes on farm legislation. The ethical inhibitions
against logrolling prevalent in our political culture mean that representatives
seldom carefully and explicitly spell out the terms of a logroll, thereby making future claims of breach hard to prove and the bargain impossible to
enforce.
To some extent, the reiterative nature of the logrolling process may mitigate the enforcement problem. Although breach might be a rational strategy
under the circumstances of a single, isolated encounter, the cost of breach
may be much higher when the representative must deal with his colleagues
repeatedly over an extended period of time.' 5 8 But even in a "repeat game,"
the covert and implicit character of most logrolls still creates formidable
enforcement difficulties.
Moreover, representatives from other states may have politically enforced
ideological constraints against dealing with unpopular representatives from
the District. This problem is especially acute because the District is widely
perceived as dominated by "radical" or "fringe" elements outside the political mainstream.
As a practical matter, these constraints will exclude many Republicans
from the universe of potential partners in a logroll. But District representatives will have a difficult time enforcing the terms of the deal against Democratic representatives. Even if these representatives vote against District
interests, Democrats can still argue with considerable force that the main
hope for District residents remains with their party. Taking retributive
measures that hurt the party will thus seem self-defeating and irrational.
158. For an extended discussion of cooperative strategies that work most effectively in repeat game situations, see R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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C.

The Preconditionsfor Home Rule

Many of these political difficulties are substantially dissipated when one
thinks about logrolling on a much broader canvas. For the States, the political protection of sovereignty does not derive principally from narrow deals
cut over specific issues. Instead, there is a kind of global, unconscious logroll that is implicit in feelings of empathy for citizens of different states and
concern for their welfare even in circumstances where representatives are
not directly responsible to them. This moral sense is captured by the sentiment that "we are all in the same boat," or, put more grandly, that freedom
is indivisible.
Although not consciously perceived as such, this mutual identification and
respect can be conceptualized as a logroll. Everyone is made better off by
mutual forbearance in the assertion of political power against rival groups
and factions. The logroll, however, is at once more subtle and less calculating than the kind of hyper-rational political bargaining postulated by public
choice theorists. New York representatives respect the sovereignty of Oregon because of a built-in sense of restraint rather than because of fear of
some direct and immediate political retribution. Representatives have internalized the anti-domination principle and, therefore, do not require either
external monitoring from the judiciary or the immediate threat of retribution
from their colleagues to respect it.
This global logroll ultimately accounts for our national identity and for
the sense that, whatever our political differences, we are a single country
with one destiny. But although this sense of identity produces strong inhibitions against domination once it is in place, putting it into place is a tricky
matter. The inhibition rests on an act of imagination - a sense that we,
ourselves, could easily be in the position of the target of domination. This
kind of imagining is far easier if the target shares our culture and world
view. If the target appears radically different, then it becomes much easier
to place the disfavored group outside the scope of the logroll.
For this reason, outgroups - "discrete and insular minorities" in Justice
Stone's famous phrase' 59 - have historically gained little protection from
the global logroll, and the struggle for emancipation of these groups has been
largely a struggle to bring them within its terms. This struggle is especially
difficult for the District because many perceive the District as being dominated by outgroups. The District is black, poor, urban, and liberal. For
much of America, it requires a truly heroic act of imagination to see that the
welfare of each of us is tied to the welfare of the inhabitants of this city.
159. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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A court cannot order this sense of identification and empathy. Political
dealmaking cannot enforce it. Yet it does not follow that litigation and politics have no role to play in establishing these essential preconditions for
home rule. Although the preconditions themselves are neither legal nor
political, at least in the usual sense, the struggle to establish them must be
both legal and political. Indeed, the legal struggle, properly understood, is
political.
The struggle consists of a persistent effort to force dominant groups to
internalize the non-domination principle with respect to the District. One
technique for doing so involves confronting these groups with the contradiction between their professed ideology and their treatment of District residents. Litigation is ideally suited to this task. For example, the legal claims
set out earlier in the Article all exploit the gap between some noncontrover160
sial constitutional postulates and the treatment of District residents.
Oddly, when litigation is understood in this way, it matters little whether
the suit is won or lost. The point of the law suit is not to obtain legal protection for District residents. The point is to serve as a focus for organizing,
protesting, arguing, and insisting. A loss in court that brings previously implicit contradictions to the surface and generates anger and determination
can be more valuable than a win.
Litigation of this sort serves as an adjunct to political mobilization around
the goal of statehood. This goal also must be properly understood. It too is
no more than a technique designed to make explicit and conscious the
double standard applied to the District. The end is full incorporation of the
District and its residents into the national political community. The District
can achieve that end only if the country as a whole begins to understand that
District residents are morally entitled to self-determination. The demand for
statehood is a tool for achieving that end, and the realization of statehood
will signal its achievement. Yet statehood itself is not the end. Statehood
will be meaningful only if the preconditions for home rule are in place. The
struggle to achieve those preconditions has barely begun.

160. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.

